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COMPETITION POLICY
IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITYln the Community  ond
throughout the world
firms compete  to develop
new products.  A close
relotionship  befween
reseorch  ond industry
is essenfloi.
n
'. . . the centrol
obiective is simple
to detine: to give
Ft rrnna  if< nrnnar
politicol personolity
with oll thot thot entoils.
It con be done
^,^,1, ,^il,, n{ "n,,,.o
but it must be done
irreversibly ond so
moke everything  the
Communily does oll
the more credible.'
locques Delors, - 
Prestdent of the
Europeon Commission,
nra<< a^nloronac
before the Moostricht
,l
5 December l99l
(^
\-orpetition meons more customer choice.  lt olso meons
lower prices. The consumer's best guorontee for obtoining
quoliry goods ond services of competitive prices is to hove
o number of suppliers compeiing for his business. Free ond
of morket-bosed ooen comoetition is o cornerstone  of our morket-bosed
economic  system. This is why the Europeon Communily
hos consistently mode competition policy o high priorily
since its creotion 35 yeors ogo. The Communily hos put
in ploce o set of rules to moke sure thot throughout the EC
firms ore operoting on o foir bosis ond thot customers get
the benefits to which they ore entitled, for competition ond
price-cutting  do not olwoys come noturolly to firms, whose
first duty to shoreholders is to moximize profits. They moy
seek to form onti-competitive  cortels to shore morkets be-
tween them or to keep prices ortificiolly hlgh or ogoin to
block newcomers  from breoking into their morkets. Govern-
ments olso sometimes distort competition by subsidizing
some firms so thot they goin on unfoir competitive  odvon-
toge over their rivols. Every yeol the Europeon Commis-
sion investigotes well over I 000 olleged breoches of
Communily rules. lt hos the power to order illegol proc-
tices to ceose ond to impose fines on the most serious cor-
porote offenders.Worldwide  compefition
hos brought odvonced
fechnology  wit'hin the
reoch of young people.
everpresent  need
for the protecfion
of the consumer
from competitive
THE BENEFITS OF
COMPETITION
Competition  policy is an obstroct  no-
tion to monv but its benefits to us oll ore
tonqible. To identifv monv of these,
one" need only look ot the shoddy
qoods ond inodequote services  pro-
iided under the'Stote monopoly
svstems which ooeroted in former Com-
munist Europe With,in ihe, Community,
compelilion policy hos Ployed o key
role in integroting  previously seporoie
notionol morkets into o single morket -
to the benefit of consumeis  ond indu-
stry, os well os the economy os o
wno|e.
W.hqlgr" these benefits?
Comoetition provides  consumers  with o
choice of ooods ond services from
componies  in oll Member  Stotes of the
Eurooeon Communitv.
It obliges monufoclurers  ond suppliers
to keep prices os low os possible - or
risk losing business to their rivols.
A system of free competition  mokes
componies  more sensitive to customer
requiremenfs  ond wishes;  otherwise
they will be left behind  by,competitors
who ore more owore of client needs.
Firms in o monopoly posilion con sup-
ply the consumer with whot they wont
t9 produce rother thon with whot he or
she wonts to buy.
It olso stimulotes  componies  to invest
ond innovote so os to produce  better
products thon their rivols.
Componies which ore forced to com-
pete within the Community morket ore
better oble to withstond  lhe pressures of
non-Europeon rivols on world morkets.
More generolly, compelil,ion  is o bosic
mechonism of the morket economy
which ensures ihot prices reflect the
reol relotionship  between  supply ond
demond. This enobles the economy to
reollocote resources  to the mosl el-
ficient ends.
obuses, ensures thot
competif  ion policy will
olwoys ploy o vitol role
rn Europe.'
Sir Leon Britton,
Member of the
Europeo.n  Commis.sion
with responstbilily
lor competition  policy,
| 5 July I9Q I
A typicol  morkef . Morkets
come in oll shopes ond
stzes, for goods ond for
services. Compefitton
spurs producers  ono
refoilers  to greoter  ellorts,
leodtng to innovofion
ond better quolity.
of theKeen compefition  forces
firms to rotionolize. The
result for fhe consumer  is
the lorge-scole
production of goods
ot low prices.
SAFECUARDING  THE
BENEFITS
Becouse the Communily hos creoted o
sinole morket open to firms in oll Mem-
bei Stotes, it l'ros developed o slngle
set of compelition rules which opply gt
EC level. These rules ore oimed ot solq
guording consumer .benefits by preven-
ting componies ond. governments  trom
behoving in woys which restrict compe-
tition.
The rules opplying  to componies  cover
oll firms - Europeon or non-Europeon -
sellino ooods ond services in the Com-
muni[."Firms bosed outside the Com-
munity ore in breoch of the rules ,if ony
onti-competitive behoviour  they odopt  is
then imolemented on the tC morket.
Severol hove been fined ln the posi.
Community competition  policy centres
on ihe following well-defined  oreos:
Cortels: Componies  do not olwoys ,like
competilion. They con be tempted  to
cooperote  rother thon comPete  wilh
rivols lhrouqh lhe creotion of anti€om-
petitive  corLls in which they iointly fix
orices ond corve up morkets omonq
ih".reluer.  This woy they get'o steod!
revenue  ond con plon future produciion
levels with more certointy.
Customers. both orivote  consumers  ond
indusiriol ,se,t, houe io poy the price
of their behoviour.
Dominont positions: Being big is not o
sin. But i[ biq iirms with o lorge shore
of ony morkel obuse this domin-ont  pos
ition to moke customers  PoY nlgner
prices or to squeeze out smoller compe-
titors, they ore breoking EC rules. They
con do so in o voriety of woys_,_ e.9.
chorging. different prices in difterent
morkets tor no oood reoson or lm-
posing customer 
tioyolty'  through long-
term exclusive conlrocts.
Thev con eliminote  competitors  in other
woys, e.g. predotory pricing or by cut-
ting off supplies to deolers  who morkel
the competitor's  goods.
Selective distribution  systems:  Agree-
menls belween monutocturers  ono
deolers con be iustified in the interest of
'lt is no occident thot
the wealthiest ond
mosf producfive
nolions on eorth ore
those whose morkefs
ore Doseo on
fraa  eamnalilian  '
Sir Leon Britton,
l5luly l99l
I Ooerotions between  firms from the some Member Stote, between  firms
from different Member Stotes ond between  firms from o Member Stote
ond firms from third countries with on effect on the Community  morket:
(o| ocquisitions  of moiorify  holdings, (b) ocquisitions  of minority holdings,
ond (c) ioint veniures.
Source:  Twenlielh reporl  on compelition policy,
Commission  of the Europeqn  Communilies, Brussels;  Luxembourg,  I 991  .
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833 34t 2to r 384efficient distribution  or the orovision of
high quoliry ofter-soles  service.  How-
ever, lhey con be used to prevent
customers in one EC country from buy
ing o pioduct in onolher where lhe
nriro  i< rhannar
Mergers ond toke-overs:  As o moior
innovolion in EC compelifion policy,
the Europeon  Commission  wos given,
in September 
.l990, 
the outhority  to
conlrol bio meroers ond toke-overs
whlch couE restrict comoetition on the
EC morkel. In 1991, the first full yeor
of operotion,  it invesfigoled more lhon
60 mergers of which it vetoed only
one.
Motives for mergers, 
.|989-90
Strenothenino of  I
morki positi"on  I  ZSO
Exponsion  |  141
Complementority  |  29
Diversificotion  |  17
Restructuring  |  79
R&D, production 
I
ond morketing  |  21
Cooperotion  |  24
Source:  Twentiefi  reporl on competilion policy,
Commission  of the Europeon  Communities,
Brussels;  luxembourg,  l99l.
The Community  needs
firms whose size motches
thot of the morket.
However,  the obuse
of dominont morket
positions  is prohibited.
Aid for investment  moy
be ollowed  in cerloin
industries  ond regions
which need support.
However, stricl meosurcs
ore opplied  when oid is
gronted to prosperous
THE ROLE OF
COVERNMENTS
Governments olso restrict or distorl com-
pelition in o number  of woys. They moy
be tempted to subsidize notionol firms
to helo them foce comoetition  from
comoonies in other oorts of the Com-
munily. Sometimes  they subsidize  Stote
owned  firms to enoble tnem To com-
pete with privote sector rivols.
As physicol borriers come down,
oovernments ore no lonoer oble lo oro-
iect notionol firms direciiv from outside
competitors by shuiling'out  imported
products.  This is why they moy resort to
indirecl protection through subsidies
insteod.
Bv orontino  exclusive riqhts to certoin
rbtiopoli.i for rhe supply of bosic ser-
vices such os electricity,  woler, trons-
port or, telecommunicolions, govern-
ments directly  reslrict competition. lhe
results con be poor quolity service, little
innovotion ond hioh orices.COMPETITION
WORKS
Those who doubt the effect on price
levels of introducinq competition  need
only consider o fei, e"otples.  In .the
oir tronsport  sector, prices hove tollen
shorply on routes where competilion
hos been introduced, e.g. London-
Amsterdom or London-Dublin.
In telecommunicotions,  the inlroduction
of competition hos stimuloted the deve
looment of innovotive customer-reloted
services ond o greoter diversiry of ler-
minol equipment ot lower prices. Never-
theless.  choroes remoin  hioh for tele-
phone'servicEs which ore "still lorgely
under monopoly conlrol, with consider-
oble differences between Member
Stoles for the some service.
EC chorqes over the some distonce  ore
higher tFon those in the dereguloted
Aiericon morket. Within the dorru
nity, lonodistonce  colls inside o Mem-
ber Slote over o certoin distonce ore
cheoper thon o coll over o similor
distonce but which crosses o nolionol
frontier. Cross-border  colls ore often
between  lwo ond o holf ond three
times more exoensive.
HOW THE 'TRUST-
BUSTERS'OPERATE
Unonnounced  eorlv morninq colls ot o
compony's office'by Brusiels  investi-
gotors is the troditionol imoge of Com-
munitu 'lrust-busters' ot work. These ore
the sd-colled 'down roids' durinq  which
componies  suspected of belng involved
Consumers have o key
role,to ploy in the lorge
morket  tor consumer
goods: os the people
who ocluolly use
the products  they hove
the finol soy.
in onticompetitive behoviour  musl open
their books ond files to EC lnspectors.
However, such coses only occur where
firms ore suspected of trying to hide evi-
oence.
***
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Commission believes
thot public utilities,
such os posfo/ sevlces,
should  olso be exposed
to greoter  competition
in  tha  F' 'rnaaan
internol  morket.
'Europeon  componies  sornetimes comploin thot we hove o lrons-
oorenl ond open svsfem of compefition  policv in fie Communiiv,
while the situolion  is for less cleirr else*here.'l om ofroid thot it'
is not enough to tell these componies  hot competilion is doing
them oood ond lhol componies  operolinq irom o bose in o
countiT without o proper  competifion  policy suffer from o lock of
competitiveness. This moy be true, ond I think if is, but it is cleody
not o sufficient onswer to'wonied industriolists.
Whot we need, therefore,  is o coherent ond cleor set of rules
ogreed internolionqlly  with o proper  enforcement system, to be
o-componied  by notionol lows following the some obiectives.'
Sir Leon Britfon, VicePresident of the Commission of the Europeon
CommuniliesThe normol procedure  for opplying
competition  policy ls more stroightfor-
woro:
I . Componies involved in ogreemenls
thot co'uld offect free coripeiition
should notify the Europeon Commission
of them before they come into effect.
Most get ropid cleoronce.
2. ln coses  where  the Commission feels
on investigotion is necessory,  it con
seek oddiionol  informotion in wriiinq
or meet with representotives  of the corn'-
pony or componies  concerned. Follow-
ino ihe investiootion. the Commission
*ill then outhoiize the ogreement  in lhe
form submitted or with modificotions,  or
forbid it oltogether.
3. Where  coses of octuol onti-competi-
tive behoviour  ore brouqht to liqht, the
Commission con impose"fines o-n guil!
componies  up to the equivolent of l0%
of totol turnover. The lorgest fine for
onti-comoetitive  behoviour  to dote wos
ECU 75 million {in l99l). The fines
oct os both o punishment ond o deter-
rent.
4. Componies  who do not ogree with
o decision token bv the Commission
con oppeol  ogoinst 
'it 
before the Court
of Justice o[ the Europeon Communities
in Luxembourg.
5. Mony onti-competitive  cortels or
other obuses come to light os the result
of comploints to the Commission  by
rivol firms odverselv offected bv such
behoviour or fror members of the
qenerol public. For exomple, the Com-
irission hos ocied on o flow of com-
ploints from individuols who hove been
prevented  by cor monufoclurers ond
distributors  from buying o cor in the EC
country of their choice.
'Competition  will increose in importonce within Europe now thol
we hove reoched  on oqreemeni  on the creolion of the Europeon
Economic Areo. Toqethlr the Communilv  ond EFTA occouni  for
olmost holf of *orlJtrode. In l99O thev mode 47.2% of totol
exporfs ond 46.6% of imports. Most of this trode is corried out
wiih eoch other: in 1990. 68% of the EEA trode wos infernol.'
Sir leon Britton, VicePresident  of the Commiision of the Europeon
Communities
Accordinq to o Commission investioo-
tion, pric& for the some model con lif-
fer by up to 40% from one Member
Stote to onother. Swift oction hos been
token to estoblish consumers'  rights to
buv cors wherever  thev ore cheopest
even if this is outside iheir country of
residence.
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At motor shows,  rivol
firms compefe  with eoch
other ond present  their
models  ond prices to fhe
consumers...'- t,.:.
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